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ABSTRACT 
In this work, an improvement of the results presented by [1] Abellanas et al. (Weak Equilibrium in a Spatial Model. 
International Journal of Game Theory, 40(3), 449-459) is discussed. Concretely, this paper investigates an abstract 
game of competition between two players that want to earn the maximum number of points from a finite set of points in 
the plane. It is assumed that the distribution of these points is not uniform, so an appropriate weight to each position is 
assigned. A definition of equilibrium which is weaker than the classical one is included in order to avoid the uniqueness 
of the equilibrium position typical of the Nash equilibrium in these kinds of games. The existence of this approximated 
equilibrium in the game is analyzed by means of computational geometry techniques. 
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1. Introduction 
Works exist that generalize the study of the Nash equi- 
librium in a competitive game with two players [1,2]. 
This generalization is usually performed by means of 
new definitions of equilibrium that are weaker than the 
classical one. 
In this paper, the definition of weak equilibrium and 
the game stated in [1] is adapted to a more general game 
where an appropriate weight is assigned to each position 
the players aim for. The results included in said paper 
have been then generalized to be adapted to these new 
considerations. 
The study carried out in this article after the considera- 
tion of weights implies a step forward with respect to the 
existing competition models, since it enables a better 
adaptation to real cases. 
The description of the game is as follows: Two consi- 
dered players want to earn the maximum number of po- 
ints from a finite set of points in the plane. For this pur- 
pose they choose their positions in the plane to attract the 
largest possible weight of a given set of n weighted 
points in the plane  1, , nH p p  . 
The perpendicular bisector of the players’ locations 
partitions the plane into two regions. Each player is con- 
sidered to capture those points which lie closer to their 
own position than to that of the other player [3-8]. The 
pay-off of each player is then the total weight of the cap-
tured points. 
In formal terms, consider a strategic game   , ,G N X  , where  1,2N   is the set of two play-
ers, 2X 2 
1, 2i
 is the strategy space, and , :i X 
  is the payoff function of each player. 
The description of the payoff function in the game 
presented above is given by:  1 1 2,t t weight of the points pi such that     1 2, ,i ip td p t d  
 1 2,t t2 weight of the points pi such that       11 2 1, ,i ip t n t t  d p t d 2,  
if 1 2t t , where  ,id p t  represents the Euclidean dis-  
tance between the points pi, t. In the case where t1 = t2 
   1 21 2 1 2, , 2
nt t t t    is defined. 
Therefore, if the weight of a point pi is defined as  iw p ki , with ki > 0 and 1 nk , then the 
payoff of the first player will be the sum of the weights 
of all positions located in the same half-plane as t1, in-
cluding the points on the bisector. The payoff of the sec-
k   n
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ond player follows the same pattern, except for positions 
on the bisector. 
Along the paper, the following definitions apply: 
1) The weight of a subset  of H is   1 , , ki ip p 
    1
1
, ,
k j
k
i i i
j
w p p w p

  . 
2)  stands for the i-th weight bigger than im 2
n  that  
can be attained by a subset of H. Therefore  is recur-
sively defined as follows:  
im
   1 min / 2I H
nm w I w I
      and  
    1min /i I H im w I w I   m  for . 2i 
3) C  is the intersection of the convex hulls of the 
subsets of H with weight bigger than  . For a definition 
of the convex hull of a set, see [9]. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Sec- 
tion 2, necessary and sufficient conditions are presented 
for the weak equilibrium positions to exist in this weighted 
game. Section 3 studies the maximum number of weak 
equilibrium positions in which the two players are lo-
cated in positions of H. 
2. Weak Equilibrium 
Lillo et al. 2007 [10] present necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the Nash equilibrium positions to exist in a 
game as the one considered in this paper. These condi- 
tions are stated in terms of geometric features such as 
convex hulls. The main conclusion is that the Nash equi- 
librium in the game, if it exists, is an unique point (t, t) 
for some . In other words, both players will 
choose the same position, except in cases where the po- 
ints of H are aligned. 
2t
To avoid this situation, a definition of equilibrium 
which is weaker than the classical one is proposed: 
Definition 1: A strategy profile   is a weak 
equilibrium if: 

2
0 0
1 2,t t
   1 0 2 01 2 1 1 2 2 1 2, , , ,t t K t t K t t     
   
 where 
  1 0 0min ,1 1 2I HK w I w I t t    and 
      2 0 02 min ,I H 1 2K w I w I t t   , that is to say  
1K  is the least weight greater than  of a sub- 
set of H (analogously for
1 0 01 2,t t 
2K ). 
Remark: This definition is an adaptation to the dis- 
crete case of the  -equilibrium studied by Monderer and 
Shapley, 1996 [2]. 
A geometric analysis is developed here that extends 
the concepts relative to the study of the Nash equilibrium 
in a weighted game and underlies the search for the equi- 
librium positions, if they exist, according to the new 
definition. 
Proposition 1: 
A weak equilibrium position  necessarily sat-  0 01 2,t t 
isfies    1 0 0 2 01 2 1 1 2 1, ,t t n m m0,t t n     . 
Proof: 
If there exists a weak equilibrium position with, say,  
 1 0 01 2 1,t t n m   , then it is satisfied that  
  1 0 0 1 0 02 2 1 1 2, ,2nt t n m t t       , so  a   1 0 02 2 1,t t K 
contradiction because  0 01 2,t t  is a weak equilibrium 
position.  
Remark: The proposition yields that the payoffs in a 
weak equilibrium position must be  for a player  1n m
and  for the other or 1m 2
n  for both. It can be noted 
that 1mn   is the largest payoff smaller than 2
n  that a  
player can obtain. 
The following proposition gives a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the existence of weak equilibrium 
positions: 
Proposition 2: 
If 1m n , then there exists weak equilibrium posi- 
tions in the proposed game if and only if 
1m
C  . 
Proof: 
First it is seen that the condition is necessary: If 
1m
C  , then there exists a subset of H with weight 
greater than  such that its convex hull does not con- 
tain the position  chosen by the second player (as- 
sumed without loss of generality that the payoff of the 
second player in said position is greater or equal than  
1m
0
2t
2
n ). So if the first player is located in the position  
with a payoff lower than or equal to 
0
1t
2
n , then the first  
player can deviate to a position 1t  that separates 2  
and the convex hull aforementioned, hence the first 
player will get a payoff greater than , therefore  
0t
1m 1 01 2 1,t t K  . Consequently, there is not a position   1 2,t t0 0  of weak equilibrium. 
Now it is stated that the condition is sufficient: If  
is not the empty set, then any player can locate in 
1
 
to ensure that the other player cannot get an earning big-
ger than  in any location, because the first player 
controls all the subsets of H with weight bigger than . 
Hence, every position 
1m
C
mC
1m
1m
 ,t t  with  in  is a weak  t
1m
C
equilibrium position, because  ,
2
i nt t   for 1,2i    
and any player who deviates would obtain a payoff 
smaller or equal to .  1m
Now propositions 1 and 2 are applied to describe the 
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weak equilibrium positions. The possible weak equilib-
rium positions in the proposed game are: 
1)  with ,  belonging to ,   1 2,t t  1t 2t 1mC
 1 2, 2i
nt t   for . 1,2i 
2) If there does not exist a combination of points of H  
with weight 
2
n , the positions   with one of the  1 2,t t
points, say , belonging to 
1
, the other one, , be-
longing to ,  and . 
1t
C
mC
1m
2t
n
2m
3) If there exists a combination of points of H with  
 1 1 2,t t  2 1 2 1,t t m 
weight 
2
n , the positions  with one of the points,   1 2,t t 
say 1 , belonging to , the other point, , belong- 
ing to 
t
2m
C 2t
2
nC ,  and .  1 1 2 1,t t m n  2 1 2 1,t t m 
3. Maximum Number of Weak Equilibrium 
Positions 
Now the problem of finding the maximum number of 
points of H that can be included in 
1m
 will be consid-
ered. This subset of H can be interesting for practical 
purposes, because it carries a large number of weak equi-
librium positions in which at least one player locates in 
the position of one of the points in H. As an example, if 
the game has a political scope, where the players are par-
ties and H is a finite set of types of voters, then this sub-
set gives a large number of weak equilibrium positions 
with the parties fitting to one type of voters. 
C
Concretely the following problem is considered: 
Find the maximum number of points of H that can be 
included in 
1m
 for all the possible configurations of 
 points in the plane (no three aligned) and all the pos-
sible assignations of weights for these  points with 
2 . This last condition implies that . The 
maximum number to be found is denoted by max. 
C
n
n
m n 2n 
3.1. An Upper Bound 
The following proposition gives an upper bound for max 
that is bounded in n. A preliminary lemma is needed:  
Lemma 1: 
There is some point of H in the boundary of the con-
vex hull of H that does not belong to . 
1m
C
Proof: 
If , then the points of H are in convex position (a 
point set is in convex position if every point of the set is 
a vertex of its convex hull), so the condition 2
3n 
m n  
implies that there is a convex hull of a subset of H of 
weight 1  that does not contain every point of H. 
Hence there is a point of H in the boundary of the convex 
hull of H that does not belong to . 
m
4n  1mIf  and every point of H in the boundary of the 
convex hull of H belongs to , then every subset of H  
C
1m
C
with two elements must have weight 2
2
n  . Otherwise,  
there would be a subset of H of cardinal three with 
weight 1 , not containing every point of H in the 
boundary of the convex hull of H, a contradiction be-
cause 
1m
 contains every point of H in the boundary of 
the convex hull. With 4 being the weight of H, this im-
plies that every subset of H with two elements must have 
weight = 2. But this is possible if and only if 
m
C
  1iw p   
for every ip H  and then , a contradiction. 2
If  and every point of H in the boundary of the 
convex hull of H belongs to 
1
, then  
for every i
4m   n
4n
mC   1iw p n m 
p H  such that i  is in the boundary of 
the convex hull of H. Hence, if the four points of H with 
smallest 
p
x  coordinate are considered, say 1 , 2 , 
, , then 
1m
 is included in the convex hull of 
p p
3p 4p C p1 2 3 4 . So there is at least a point of H in the 
boundary of the convex hull of H that does not belong to 
1m
, which is the point of H with the greatest x coordi-
nate, a contradiction.  
, , ,p p p
C
Proposition 3: 
It is satisfied that max 3 . 
Proof: 
Consider a point of H in the boundary of the convex 
hull of H and not belonging to 
1m
, say n , which ex-
ists by lemma 1. Arrange the other points of H according 
to the angle with respect to n , say 1 1n
C
p
p
, ,p p  . The 
initial angle 0 is determined by a ray emanating from n  
and containing a segment of the boundary of the convex 
hull of H. Hence, if  is the smallest index such that  
p
i
 1, , ip p  has weight greater than 2
n , then  
  1 1, , ,i nw p p p m ,   1 1, , 2i nw p p   , so  
  1, , , 2i n n nw p p p  . This last inequality implies that    2 1 1, , , ,i i i n nw p p p p p m    1 , so 1m  is included in 
the intersection of the convex hulls of , 
C  1, , ,i np p p 2 1 1, , , , ,i i i n np p p p p  
p
. This intersection is included 
in the region limited by the ray emanating from n  to 
2i
p
  and the ray emanating from  to i . This re-
gion contains four points of H: , ,  and . 
np
p 
p
p p2i 1i i n
But n  is not in 1m  by the assumption, so at most 
three points of H can be located in 
1m
 and then 
p 
p C
C
max 3 . Note that if 2i  , then 2i  makes no sense. 
But in this case 
1m
 is included in the convex hull of 
p 
C , , np1 2p p
mC
, so at most two points of H are included in 
. 
1
Remark: If 3n   and , then a point of H, 
say 1 , must have weight 1 . Hence 1m  is contained 
in the intersection of the convex hulls of 
2m n
m
3
p C  1 2,p p ,  1 3,p p , that is to say, in . As a matter of fact,  1p p
1 1m
C   because every subset of H with weight 
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greater than  contains to . So max = 1 for 1m 1p 3n  . 
3.2. Examples Where the Upper Bound Is  
Attained 
Now it can be seen that for even , , the upper 
bound for max is attained in an example with equally 
weighted points, so  for even , : 
n 4n 
n nmax 3 4
Example 1:  
Let  be an even number greater than 4 and consider 
 points  in convex position. If three new 
points 2n , 1n , n  are located in the intersection 
 of the convex hulls of the subsets of  
n
p
 2
3n 
 3 ,nC 
1, , np 
p
p
p
3
3
 1, , np p   with 3 2 

2 
n   points, in such way that  
the  points are in general position (no three points in 
the same line) and weight 1 is assigned to each point, 
then a set 1
n
 , , nH p p np
max
n 
 with three points in  
 is obtained. 
1m
C p p2 1 
An example with 3 points in 
1m
 can be seen for odd 
n, , so  for odd , : 
, ,n n
C
n5n  3 5n 
Example 2: 
Consider  points  with weight  3 1, ,p  3np 
1
n
n   each in the vertices of a regular polygon, a point 
 with weight 2np 
2
1
n
n   in  and two points 
,  with weight 
 3 ,2nC
1np  np 1
n
n 
n

 each and in . First  nC  2 ,2
it is noted that 2n  can be located in the intersection 
aforementioned and non-collinear with two points of 
1 3  because that intersection does not have an 
empty interior set. In the same way it can be seen that the 
points 1n , n  can be located i 2 ,2n  such that 
e n  points are in general position because this last 
intersection also does not have an empty interior set. 
p 
 , , np p 
p 
th
p
n
  C 
Now it can be seen that there does exist a subset of  
 1, ,H p  p  with weight 2
n . If it is considered 
1
2
nk   points of weight 
1
n
n  , then the weight of the 
subset is 
1 2
n
n 
nk  . Hence a subset of H with weight 
 must contain 1m 1 22
n    points of weight 
1
n
n   or 
1
2
n   points of weight 
1
n
n  and . In this last  2np 
case, if said set of points does not contain both 1np  ,  
np , then it must contain at least 
3 1
2
n    points from  
 1, , np p 
1np  np
3  and 2n , so its convex hull contains 
,  by the construction of the set H. In the former  
p 
case, the said set of points contains at least 3 2
2
n     
points from  1, , np p  3 , so its convex hull contains 
2np  , 1np  ,  by the construction of the set H. Con- 
sequently, 
np
p 2n , 1np  ,  belong to C  as desired. n 1m
Now examples of sets H with three points in  are 
shown for 
p
1m
C
4,5n  : 
Example 3: 
Consider three non-collinear points 1 , 2 , 3  and 
a point  inside the triangle having vertices , ,  
p p p
1p4p 2p
3p . Assign weight 
4
3
 to , , 1p 3p
2
3
 to , . See 
Figure 1. This allows for 
2p 4p
1m
8
3
 , which is attained in  
the following subsets of  1 4, ,H p p  : ,  1 2 4, ,p p p 2 3 4, ,p p p ,  1 3,p p . Hence the subsets of H  with  
weight 8  must contain ,  and one point of  1p 3p3

 2 4,p p , and then their convex hulls contain the convex 
hull of  1 3 4, ,p p p . This implies that  contains 1mC 1 3 4
Example 4: 
, ,p p p . 
Consider three non-collinear points 1 , 2 , 3  and 
two points ,  inside the triangle having vertices  
p p p
4p 5p
1p , , . Assign weight 2p 3p
5
3
 to , 1p
5
6
 to , …, 
. See Figure 2. This allows for 
2p
5p 1m
10
3
 , which is  
 
 
Figure 1. Example for n = 4.  is the shaded region. mC 1
 
p5
5/6
5/6
5/3
5/6
5/6
 
Figure 2. Example for n = 5. is the shaded region. mC 1
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attained in the subsets of 1 5, ,H p p  of cardin
in the set p
al 
f 
three containing 1p  and 2 3 4 5, , ,p p p .  
Hence the subsets o

H  with weight 10
3
 must con - 
tain to 1p  and at least three points of ,p p p ,  2 3 4 5, ,p 1 4 5, , p . This
points o
and then heir convex hulls contain p p  
implies that 
1m
C  contains this set of three f 
 t
H . 
Proposition  its remark and the previous exam 3, ples 
yi
hat  for 
4. Conclusions 
ensional competition model has been 
erations mean a step forward in the com-
pe
lib
w
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